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The documentS–1Anthropic, PBC26 OCT 2026 · 421 PP.
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enterprise  relationships,  and  damage  to  our  reputation  and  brand,  any  of  which  could  adversely  affect  our 
business, financial condition, and results of operations.

For example, in September 2025, we detected and assessed with high confidence that a Chinese state-sponsored 
hacking  group  manipulated  our  Claude  Code  tool  into  attempting  infiltration  into  roughly  30  global  targets, 
including  large  technology  companies,  financial  institutions,  chemical  manufacturing  companies,  and 
government  agencies,  resulting  in  a  limited  number  of  successful  intrusions.  We  believe  this  is  the  first 
documented case of a large-scale cyberattack executed without substantial human intervention. We expect that 
malicious actors, including sophisticated state-sponsored actors, will continue to seek to leverage our models, 
platform, and applications for harmful actions, including by circumventing our safeguards, and their efforts to 
do  so  may  increase  as  the  capabilities  of  our  technology  increase.  Any  successful  attempt  to  misuse,  or  any 
perceived  misuse  of,  our  models,  platform,  and  applications  for  a  cyberattack  or  for  any  other  malicious 
purpose could result in exposure to liability, disruption of our customer or other commercial relationships, or 
damage to our reputation. The risks of such harms may increase as the cybersecurity-related capabilities of our 
models, platform, and applications increase. Independent security researchers and other third parties have also 
used,  and  may  in  the  future  use,  our  models  to  identify  and  exploit  vulnerabilities  in  the  systems  of  other 
companies, including other AI developers, at times in connection with authorized bug bounty programs. While 
such  activity  may  be  lawful  and  consistent  with  industry  practice  for  vulnerability  research,  it  illustrates  that 
our models can function as a general-purpose tool for gaining unauthorized access to third-party systems, and 
comparable  capabilities  could  be  used  by  malicious  actors  without  authorization.  Such  incidents,  whether  or 
not  we  are  a  direct  party  to  them,  may  draw  public  and  regulatory  attention  to  the  offensive  cybersecurity 
capabilities of our models and could result in reputational harm, calls for additional restrictions on our models, 
or claims that we failed to adequately safeguard against such uses. For more information about risks related to 
security incidents, see the section titled “—Any security breaches or other incidents, including those that affect 
our  networks,  systems,  or  data,  or  the  networks,  systems,  or  data  of  our  service  providers,  suppliers,  or 
customers, could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.”

As  part  of  our  commitment  to  responsible  security  research  and  transparency,  we  disclose  information  about 
the capability and safety of our models, the safeguards that we have adopted with respect to our models, and 
instances  of  misuse  of  our  technology,  such  as  the  September  2025  cyberattack  described  above.  We  also 
publish  model  system  cards,  our  research  findings,  and  other  safety-related  information.  We  take  steps  to 
ensure that such disclosures will not materially assist malicious activity and weigh the benefits and risks of such 
disclosures  from  an  ecosystem  preparedness  perspective;  however,  malicious  actors,  including  sophisticated 
state-sponsored  adversaries,  have  in  the  past  and  may  in  the  future  use  those  disclosures  to  assist  their 
attempts  to  circumvent  our  safeguards  and  security  measures,  thereby  increasing  the  risks  of  misuse  of  our 
models,  platform,  and  applications,  as  well  as  the  potential  for  exposure  to  liability,  regulatory  or  litigation 
proceedings,  or  other  harms.  In  addition,  because  these  disclosures  describe  risks  and  observed  model 
behaviors  in  detail,  they  may  draw  heightened  public,  media,  or  regulatory  attention  and  could  be  cited  by 
regulators, litigants, or others in proceedings or claims against us. The steps we take to prevent misuse of our 
models, platform, and applications could be incomplete or may fail to operate as intended, and any actual or 
perceived misuse could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.

Our  AI  models  may  behave  in  unintended,  misaligned,  or  autonomous  ways,  including  by 
taking harmful actions that no user or third party directed, which could adversely affect our 
reputation and brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations.

Our  AI  models  may  themselves  cause  harm  by  producing  undesirable  outputs  or  behaving  in  unintended, 
misaligned, or autonomous ways, including by taking unintended or harmful actions that no user or third party 
directed.  These  risks  may  increase  as  our  models  become  more  capable  and  are  granted  greater  autonomy, 
permissions,  and  integration  with  external  systems.  Although  we  continue  to  study  why  these  behaviors 
emerge,  our  understanding  continues  to  evolve,  and  we  may  be  unable  to  anticipate  or  understand  such 
behaviors in the future. 

In addition, our models have been and may continue to be deployed in high-risk or sensitive contexts, such as 
healthcare, scientific and biomedical research, drug discovery and development, legal, finance, government, or 
other  critical  decision-making  environments,  and  in  connection  with  hardware,  where  undesirable  model 
behaviors—which  are  inherently  non-deterministic  and  may  manifest  in  unpredictable  ways,  such  as  errors, 
inaccuracies, biased or unsolicited views or hallucinations—could lead to serious harm, liability, or reputational 

45

Text is provided for reference. Check the original for tables, images, and exact formatting.

Find a section 16 starting points

Section links may begin before the exact paragraph cited in a finding. PDF numbers below use physical pages.

  1. Founders’ letterp. 3SEC
  2. Defined termsp. 12SEC
  3. Prospectus summaryp. 16SEC
  4. Risk factorsp. 38SEC
  5. Management’s discussion & analysisp. 144SEC
  6. Businessp. 190SEC
  7. Governancep. 254SEC
  8. Executive compensationp. 275SEC
  9. Related-person transactionsp. 293SEC
  10. Principal & selling stockholdersp. 299SEC
  11. Capital-stock rightsp. 303SEC
  12. Shares eligible for future salep. 318SEC
  13. Underwritingp. 327SEC
  14. Auditor change & expertsp. 345SEC
  15. Financial statements & notesp. 347SEC
  16. Part II & exhibit indexp. 413SEC

How this was made

Read in full.
Kept in context.

A snapshot of the filing dated , rather than a live record of later events.

3primary reviewers
421pages reviewed
43image instances checked

The review

Three primary reviewers read non-overlapping ranges of the complete main filing. All 43 embedded image instances were transcribed and visually reviewed, including the founders’ letter, charts, and customer case studies. Financial tables were also checked visually for dates, units, and column alignment.

A separate reviewer checked the draft’s calculations, accounting interpretations, and customer qualifications. An additional check covered the later merged findings. The result is 62 findings and 21 customer examples.

The boundary

Companion contracts and other exhibits named in the filing’s index are separate documents and were not independently reviewed. Customer outcomes, technical benchmarks, forecasts, and scientific priority claims remain attributed company or customer disclosures.

The numbers

Dollar figures are U.S. dollars. H1 means the six months ended June 30; Q2 means the three months ended June 30. The 2026 interim financial statements are unaudited. Our calculations show their inputs and are labeled separately from reported values.

Blank fields stay undisclosed. Figures with different periods, conditions, or potentially overlapping scopes are kept separate. An earlier tender price is not an IPO price.

What the evidence labels mean
Reported in filing
A company disclosure, with the period and accounting basis retained.
Company estimate / company claim
An estimate or assertion attributed to the company, with its uncertainty preserved.
Our calculation
A derived figure using cited inputs. It is not a separately reported company metric.
Customer example
A selected case study, with its measurement limits. It is not representative ROI.
Proposed / conditional
A status qualifier for an arrangement that is not yet effective or depends on stated conditions.

About updates. This edition is tied to the October 26, 2026 filing. Any later revision should identify its new source date and preserve the basis of earlier claims.

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A closer look at the filing

Anthropic · Form S-1PDF 1

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Filed October 26, 2026. PDF is approximately 46 MB and opens only when requested. Section links may precede the exact cited paragraph.