Small print.
Wide open.

Table of Contents

harmful output of our models that we did not detect, and there may be future instances that we will not detect. 
Any of the foregoing risks could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.

If we are unable to manage the risks related to our focus on and commitment to AI safety, our 
brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.

Balancing  Safety  and  Commercial  Objectives.  Our  commitment  to  AI  safety  requires  us  to  make  difficult 
judgments  that  balance  safety  considerations  against  commercial  objectives,  competitive  pressures,  and 
stakeholder  expectations.  We  often  make  judgment  calls  with  respect  to  when  we  determine  a  model  is  safe 
enough to release and which capabilities to develop or restrict. For example, in April 2026, we initially released 
our  frontier  model,  Mythos,  as  a  gated  research  preview  through  Project  Glasswing,  available  to  select 
organizations  for  cybersecurity  applications,  rather  than  making  it  broadly  available  at  launch  due  to  its 
advanced capabilities in cyber vulnerability discovery. We expect that frontier models with similar or enhanced 
capability  profiles,  whether  developed  by  us  or  by  other  AI  labs,  will  continue  to  emerge,  and  that  future 
Anthropic models exhibiting such capabilities may be subject to access constraints. More broadly, we believe it 
is  important  to  assess  the  safety  of  our  models  not  only  at  release  but  throughout  their  development.  For 
models we anticipate will have novel capabilities or present novel safety risks, we plan to evaluate the safety of 
each  stage  of  training,  including  pretraining,  post-training,  and  internal  deployment,  and  we  may  delay  or 
pause a stage when we are not confident in our safety measures for that stage. For example, we recently chose to 
delay  pre-training  a  new  frontier  base  model  for  more  than  a  month  to  allow  time  to  further  enhance  our 
security  measures  related  to  preventing  model  weight  exfiltration  and  protecting  our  intellectual  property. 
There can be no assurance, however, that the safeguards or access regimes we adopt will prove adequate, that 
we  will  correctly  identify  which  capabilities  require  restriction,  or  that  constraints  we  impose  will  not  be 
circumvented.  These  judgments  are  particularly  consequential  because,  as  AI  systems  become  more  capable, 
the potential severity of harm from misaligned or misused models increases correspondingly, and a wide range 
of  stakeholders,  including  researchers  and  policymakers,  have  raised  concerns  that  sufficiently  advanced  AI 
systems could pose catastrophic or existential risks to society if not developed and deployed responsibly. Our 
safety-focused approach is designed in part to mitigate such risks, but there can be no assurance that our efforts 
will  be  successful  or  that  the  broader  AI  industry  will  adopt  similar  safeguards.  In  particular,  as  AI  systems 
become  more  autonomous  and  capable  of  taking  consequential  actions  with  less  human  oversight,  there  is  a 
risk  that  such  systems  could,  whether  due  to  misalignment  with  human  intentions,  errors  in  objective 
specification,  or  self-preserving  behaviors,  take  harmful  actions  independently  and  at  scale  without  human 
intervention.  Even  if  our  own  models  do  not  cause  such  harm,  a  significant  safety  incident  involving  any 
frontier  AI  could  trigger  broad  reputational  damage  to  the  AI  industry,  public  backlash,  and  sweeping 
regulatory responses that could adversely affect our business. For example, in September 2026, media reports 
citing  a  senior  Federal  Trade  Commission  (“FTC”)  official  indicated  that  the  FTC  has  opened  non-public 
investigations  into  the  potential  risks  that  increasingly  autonomous  AI  systems  may  pose  to  consumers.  In 
October  2026,  the  FTC  issued  a  civil  investigative  demand  to  us  seeking  information  about  our  consumer 
protection, data protection, and privacy practices, as well as the safety and security of our products. The scope 
of any investigation of us or its outcome, and any investigation, enforcement action, or adverse finding arising 
from this or similar inquiries could result in significant costs, require changes to how we design, test, or deploy 
our  models,  platform,  and  applications,  or  otherwise  adversely  affect  our  business,  financial  condition,  and 
results of operations. We may misjudge these trade-offs, either by being overly cautious and potentially losing 
market opportunities, or by being insufficiently rigorous and releasing models, platforms, or applications that 
cause harm. Even where human oversight mechanisms are in place, such mechanisms may prove insufficient in 
practice  if  the  volume,  speed,  or  complexity  of  autonomous  agent  actions  exceeds  the  capacity  of  human 
reviewers to meaningfully evaluate and intervene, and any perceived failure of our oversight mechanisms could 
expose  us  to  regulatory  enforcement,  liability  claims,  and  reputational  harm.  For  more  information,  see  the 
section titled “—If the use of our AI models results in harm, whether through use by malicious actors or misuse 
by other third parties, or if our model guardrails or safeguards fail to prevent such misuse, our reputation and 
brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.” 

Moreover,  governmental  authorities  have  restricted,  and  may  in  the  future  further  restrict,  the  availability  of 
our models, including based on their assessment of the capabilities or safeguards of our models, independent of 
our own safety-based access decisions. For example, in June 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed 
worldwide export restrictions on our Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models, which we disabled for all customers until 
those  restrictions  were  lifted.  For  more  information,  see  the  section  titled  “—Governmental  trade  controls, 

51